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“All politics is local,” mis-attributed to Rep. Tip O’Neill (D-MA)1
INTRODUCTION
If all politics is local, then litigation is surely so, especially in 
high-stakes United States Supreme Court litigation and drilling 
deeply, civil rights cases. Almost by definition, given how hard it is 
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1. Fred R. Shapiro, The Way We Live Now: On Language; Familiar 
Words from Unfamiliar Speakers, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2008, at 16 (noting the mis-
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to bring a case before the Court, all Supreme Court cases are 
important, but if the cultural wars are waged in the polity, 
Appomattox is the Supreme Court. In this Essay, I trace several arcs 
bending towards this tribunal, particularly the rise of purposive civil 
rights organizations, defined as national focused groups that 
undertake litigation and legal reform for a given civil rights project, 
the leading example being the ACLU or the NAACP Legal Defense 
Fund. Using the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational 
Fund (MALDEF) as a focused case study, I discuss the development 
and maintenance of litigation/legislative agendas, major litigation 
issues that arise—with substantive, tactical, and procedural 
valences—and other features of becoming authoritative repeat 
players on given and identifiable themes. While focusing on 
MALDEF’s organizational saga and political economy, I also discuss 
developing examples such as those in emerging areas of same-sex 
litigation and similar issues where national players are vying for 
control of important laws, policies, and cases. In particular, I will 
analyze the discursive narratives that are essential to messaging and 
control of themes in the broader polity and examine the unique and 
high-stakes issues of a purposive United States Supreme Court 
practice and how organizational DNA and resources affect litigation 
strategies. Virtually all the moving parts of this balancing act have 
spawned volumes and will continue to do so. It is an introductory 
exploration, and my conclusions are less conclusory than they are 
suggestive. 
To begin this inquiry, it can be useful to consider briefly how 
cases move through the system and make their way to the United 
States Supreme Court, such as schoolchildren learn in their civics 
lessons. The most common pathway enables disputes to arise from 
the state and federal lower courts, with the losers in these disputes 
seeking appeals at the next level to overturn the decision. In a 
traditional Term calendar, the Court will hear and decide the cases 
on the merits with full opinion (or opinions) in fewer than 100 
instances.2 Annually, the nearly 8,000 cases that surface are 
winnowed to the approximately eighty or ninety that live on to their 
                                                     
2. Data sources on these complex calculations can be found at U.S.
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1980 TO 2010 (Mar. 23, 2015), http://www2.census.gov/library/publications/2011/ 
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States Courts, U.S. COURTS, www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness.aspx (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2015); Statistics, SCOTUSBLOG, www.scotusblog.com/statistics 
(last visited Oct. 27, 2015). 
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day in court that Term.3 There is an elaborate minuet or kabuki dance 
that has developed in this process of considering and accepting the 
various cert. petitions that has drawn most detailed attention by 
political scientists, historians, and legal scholars.  
In this scenario, the intricacies of the complex process are well 
understood by the many actors, including the Justices (especially the 
Chief Justice, who administers the primary sorting mechanisms) and 
the multiple institutional players. Any scorecard would include the 
judicial clerks who read and review the pooled cert. petitions; the 
United States Solicitor General, who determines the United States’ 
governmental interests in a given case (whether or not the United 
States is a formal party) and who signals the Administration 
preferences by briefs and alignment choices; congressional leaders, 
who pass statutes and influence the process; and other attorneys and 
interest groups, many of whom will be repeat players with broad 
political purposes and ideological interests. These various actors 
engage the larger process with competing scripts, resources, and 
opportunities to convey their interests and state their preferences. 
Such means include careful parsing of cert. denials (where the 
Justices are themselves engaged actors through their own signaling 
behavior and invitations to additional litigation);4 a more robust 
exchange mechanism in the form of amicus curiae briefs, the 
traditional public means employed by third parties to focus the 
Court’s (and others’) attention to their point of view and legal 
nuance;5 and the entire panoply of discursive narrative devices to 
advance interests—a short list of these would be the various forms of 
media and news outlets across all the formats; study groups and 
                                                     
3. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 2.
4. See Peter Linzer, The Meaning of Certiorari Denials, 79 COLUM. L.
REV. 1227 (1979) (detailed study of cert denials and imbedded patterns); Robert L. 
Boucher & Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Justices as Strategic Decision Makers: 
Aggressive Grants and Defensive Denials on the Vinson Court, 57 J. POL. 824 
(1995) (same). 
5. For a detailed and comprehensive narrative of these features and the 
many authors, see VANESSA A. BAIRD, ANSWERING THE CALL OF THE COURT: HOW 
JUSTICES AND LITIGANTS SET THE SUPREME COURT AGENDA 17-32 (2007). In a wide-
ranging article measuring a variety of civil rights cases across domains, Theodore 
Eisenberg summarized over 1,600 federal cases and noted, “[C]ivil rights plaintiffs 
are making less use of federal courts over time. Nonprisoner civil rights cases are a 
declining fraction of federal civil cases. Trials continue to disappear, and evidence 
exists that some of the low trial rate is attributable to increasing civil rights case 
settlement rates.” Theodore Eisenberg, Four Decades of Federal Civil Rights 
Litigation, 12 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 4, 28 (2015). 
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think-tank messaging; and the many means of surfacing issues and 
branding such organizational messages.6
This universe of communicative signaling devices is usefully 
termed by political scientists Tom S. Clark and Benjamin Lauderdale 
as “doctrine space,” most notably in the citation patterns of the 
individual Court members to frame and cite precedents in their 
opinions. The authors have noted: 
We seek to estimate the legal position taken by a given opinion. One 
way that court opinions reveal their content is by which precedents they 
cite positively (aƥrming the argument of the older opinion) and which 
they cite negatively (disputing the argument of the previous opinion). We 
develop a scaling model which estimates the location of opinions by 
assuming that the probability of positively citing an- other opinion is a 
decreasing function of the policy distance between the two opinions. 
Using original data on which precedents are cited positively or negatively 
by each opinion, we estimate locations in a single-dimensional space for 
each search and seizure and freedom of religion opinion authored by the 
Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts (1953–2004). These estimates 
allow fine-grained, systematic analysis of the doctrinal content of Supreme 
Court opinions. Our method can be used to study a variety of substantive 
problems, including, but not limited to, intracourt bargaining, the judicial 
hierarchy, the eơect of separation-of-powers mechanisms on judicial 
policymaking, and the consequences of Supreme Court nominations.7
Considering these liminal spaces can mask the informal 
networks that exist and are used by all the parties to communicate 
with each other. For example, political theorist Vanessa A. Baird has 
also carefully observed the various coded cues and has noted that, 
while the individual Justices can only decide matters properly 
presented to them, they are very sensitive to the multiple pathways 
where they are able to telegraph their wishes and hopes to various 
parties, particularly the salient policy and litigation elites (she 
characterizes these as the multiple “[p]olicy entrepreneurs”) that 
regularly practice in front of the Court and who bring (and create) 
the cases that will advance their specific organizational interests:  
These litigants pay attention to information about the justices’ policy 
priorities, prompting them to “find” appropriate cases for the justices in 
those desired policy areas. . . . Justices benefit from the litigants’ 
perceptions that their reputations are important; they also depend on 
                                                     
6. See Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 18; see also Tom S. Clark & Aaron B. 
Strauss, The Implications of High Court Docket Control for Resource Allocation and 
Legal Efficiency, 22 J. THEORETICAL POL. 247, 266 (2010). 
7. Tom S. Clark & Benjamin Lauderdale, Locating Supreme Court 
Opinions in Doctrine Space, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 871, 872 (2010). 
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litigants’ willingness to support cases to influence political or legal 
change.8  
She has identified four- to five-year cycles, during which the best 
cases can be brought in alignment with the Court membership, the 
issue timing, the various litigation tactics and strategic behavior, and 
the appearance of lower court decisions or circuit splits that might 
propel a given issue to the fore.9 If the organizations are playing the 
long game, there is always the litigation season itself and the equally 
important perennial spring training months. 
I. THE EMERGENCE AND INEVITABILITY OF PURPOSIVE LITIGATION 
ORGANIZATIONS
I have attempted to explain briefly how formal cases progress 
and ripen through the system of pathways to emerge for full 
consideration by the Supreme Court, a deceptively complex process 
with observable criteria and interactive spaces, ones that shape the 
arc of cases and the degrees of freedom available to the Court. After 
laying out this introductory groundwork, I turn to what Vanessa 
Baird labeled an important “policy entrepreneur” organization, the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), established in 1920.10 The 
organization has a broad and identifiable policy focus, a network of 
community interests and identity, a large national community-based 
membership that supports its goals and provides resources and 
expertise, and many hundreds of disputes that arise on a regular basis 
to produce litigation.11 Moreover, the ACLU’s core values extend to 
many dimensions of the country’s public life and reach across a 
broad ideological span of influence, such as progressive 
nondiscrimination issues of racial profiling and immigrant rights as 
well as more traditional libertarian issues of privacy, free speech, and 
freedom of association. Its many lawyers—it employs nearly 200 full 
time lawyers and has access to another 2,000 volunteer attorneys—
are repeat players in what has become the modern Supreme Court 
practice. It is well established with a comprehensive decentralized 
                                                     
8. BAIRD, supra note 5, at 31. 
9. Id. at 33-72.
10. See id. at 29-30; SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN 
LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU 3 (1990). 
11. WALKER, supra note 10, at 4.  
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and national governance structure, allowing it to become involved 
and shape important legislative, public policy, and litigation events.12
Political scientist James Q. Wilson described a “purposive” 
organization in his book, Political Organizations:
The dramatic increase in the membership of civil rights, environmental, 
civil liberties, political reform, and feminist organizations that occurred in 
the 1970s could not be explained entirely or even largely by the ability of 
such groups to exert social pressure or supply selective benefits, though 
these inducements no doubt played a role. To some extent, members were 
responding to purposive appeals,13
which he defined as a comprehensive program of focused ideological 
issues, salient appeals, perceived threats, and “solidary, material, and 
purposive incentives” that are detailed and communicated to forge 
group membership and to recruit potential members with similar 
concerns and commitments.14
Legal scholar Omari Simmons has noted the role of these 
organizations in participating through litigation, especially through 
the targeted use of amicus briefs: 
In addition to robust participation by diverse amici, the content of the 
arguments raised by amici illustrates how amicus participation provides a 
deliberative and discursive forum. The perspectives of amici may enhance 
the prospect of better substantive decisions and the mere opportunity to 
participate in the lawmaking process enhances the Court’s legitimacy even 
where a party disagrees with the ultimate outcome. Discursive debate and 
participation is particularly important for groups normally excluded from 
the legislative process.15  
While the public messaging is virtually always positive and 
idealistic, some purposive groups resort to apocalyptic terminology 
and invoke tropes of fear and loathing to secure their views. It is 
jarring, for example, to read carefully the message by the 
conservative Christian organization The Alliance Defense Fund, 
                                                     
12. See generally WALKER, supra note 10; LEIGH ANN WHEELER, HOW SEX 
BECAME A CIVIL LIBERTY (2014). The national website gives many program details, 
including extensive case files and links to decentralized ACLU affiliates in major 
cities. AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2015). 
13. JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS viii (Princeton Univ. 
Press 1995) (1974). 
14. Id. at viii, xii. The Princeton paperback version updated the original 
1974 Basic Books edition, elaborating substantially on Wilson’s original purposive 
organizations analysis. Id. at viii. 
15. Omari Scott Simmons, Picking Friends from the Crowd: Amicus 
Participation as Political Symbolism, 42 CONN. L. REV. 185, 216 (2009) (footnotes 
omitted). 
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recently reconstituted as the Alliance Defending Freedom (ADF).16
The ADF has become one of the most active and successful 
purposive organizations in challenging colleges to accommodate 
sectarian religious free exercise and certain cultural expressions. The 
ADF website reveals its avowed and focused purpose in crusade 
terminology: Our religious freedom is at stake. 
Now, more than ever, the core values we cherish are under fierce and 
relentless legal attack by those who are determined to silence people of 
faith and redefine the U.S. Constitution. These challenges are more than 
legal skirmishes...they are ongoing, pitched battles for the soul of our 
nation.17
Many schools fear an ACLU lawsuit, so they clamp down on Christian 
expression. Standing alone, parents and grandparents are often 
overmatched by our tax-funded public education system and activists who 
want to remove faith from public schools.  
But when the Body of Christ stands and fights together, we can - and we 
do - win.18  
The ADF’s battleground is an exceedingly narrow view both of 
religious freedom and of the question of whose culture is at risk, 
given the substantial majority privilege Christians occupy in the 
country.19 Muslims and Jews are the target of much religious bigotry 
and intolerance in the United States and worldwide, and it is not 
clear if certain Christian groups have entirely thought through what a 
                                                     
16. History, ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM, http://www.adflegal.org/about-
us/who-we-are/history (last visited Oct. 27, 2015).  
17. ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM, WHAT DOES RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
MEAN TO YOU?, https://adflegal.blob.core.windows.net/web-content-dev/documents/ 
adf_signaturebrochure2012_final.pdf?sfvrsn=8 (last visited Nov. 25, 2015). 
18. What you Must Know About Religious Freedom in Public Schools,
ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM, http://www.adflegal.org/protect-christian-students 
(last visited Nov. 25, 2015). Until recently, the ADF website read, “We must 
continue the fight for religious freedom and the right of conscience, so that the life-
changing message of Jesus Christ can be proclaimed and transform our culture. Each 
win for the Body of Christ is a loss for the opposition. It’s that black and white.”
THE ELECTRONIC CHURCH IN THE DIGITAL AGE: CULTURAL IMPACTS OF EVANGELICAL 
MASS MEDIA 214 (Mark Ward Sr. ed., 2015). It has since changed to the language 
above. 
19. In the more narrow context of higher education litigation and the ADF, 
I review this relationship in MICHAEL A. OLIVAS, SUING ALMA MATER: HIGHER 
EDUCATION AND THE COURTS 147-53 (2013). I have also drawn on this 2013 full 
length monograph for some of the research and references in this project. 
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win for “the Body of Christ” might mean across many secular 
domains.20
To many observers, the quintessential “policy entrepreneur” or 
“purposive” educational civil rights organization would be the 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund (the LDF), the organization founded in 
1940 and led for many years by lawyer Thurgood Marshall, which 
had as its clear focus to dismantle the apartheid system of Jim Crow 
America, leading to the towering 1954 Brown v. Board of Education
case and other civil rights actions before and since.21 Conservative 
groups have successfully adopted the LDF model to advance their 
causes, particularly in opposing racial aƥrmative action and secular 
humanism; their rise has coincided with the more conservative 
Supreme Court direction evident since the 1970s. These groups have 
not only employed the litigation strategies of the LDF, the 
MALDEF, and other progressive public interest racial organizations, 
they have even begun to appropriate the argot and nomenclature of 
the progressive and liberal groups, styling themselves as the “Center 
for Equal Opportunity” (CEO), which touts itself as “the nation’s 
only conservative think tank devoted to issues of race and 
ethnicity,“22 and “The Center for Individual Rights” (CIR), “a 
nonprofit public interest law firm dedicated to the defense of 
individual liberties against the increasingly aggressive and 
unchecked authority of federal and state governments.”23 CIR, for 
example, litigated the 2003 aƥrmative action challenges, while CEO 
has filed several actions to thwart postsecondary aƥrmative action 
programs. One attorney who has litigated many anti-immigrant cases 
has conceded he took his inspiration from MALDEF, a provenance 
                                                     
20. See id.; Michael A. Olivas, Who Gets to Guard the Gates of Eden?,
INSIDE HIGHER ED. (June 29, 2010), http://www.insidehighered.com/views/ 
2010/06/29/olivas. 
21. Baird notes the dozens of purposive organizations and legal defense 
funds on both sides of the spectrum that have taken their approach from the LDF. 
See BAIRD, supra note 5, at 46-48. Among the best of the many reviews of the long 
history of the LDF, I have found most helpful TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO 
DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2011). 
The often-told tale of the LDF remains inspirational and bends towards justice. I
have found most helpful several recent works. See, e.g., id.; Christopher W. 
Schmidt, Divided by Law: The Sit-Ins and the Role of the Courts in the Civil Rights 
Movement, 33 LAW & HIST. REV. 93 (2015). 
22. Mission Statement, CTR. FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, http://www.ceousa. 
org/about-ceo/mission (last visited Oct. 27, 2015). 
23. Mission, THE CTR. FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, https://www.cir-usa.org/ 
mission/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2015).  
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and attribution that must upset the pro-immigrant organization’s 
lawyers to no end.24
In celebrating its twentieth anniversary in 2009, CIR 
acknowledged its debt to the earlier civil rights firms and their 
struggles for racial equality:  
Nowhere did liberal public interest law firms enjoy greater moral 
authority than in the area of civil rights. The NAACP Legal Defense 
Fund’s forty-year eơort to end discrimination in public schools stands for 
many as the model of tenacious public interest law advocacy. 
Yet what began as a principled eơort to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s requirement that the state neither favor nor disfavor any 
individual because of his race turned into a systematic eơort to favor 
particular racial groups in employment, government contracting, and 
college admission, often in blatant disregard of Supreme Court precedent 
in this area.25
In claiming lineage to the LDF, CIR successfully undertook the 
Hopwood26 litigation, only to see the U.S. Supreme Court eventually 
overturn Hopwood in the 2003 Grutter case,27 reestablishing the 
1978 precedent of UC Regents v. Bakke and upholding the use of 
aƥrmative action in college admissions.28 Following this defeat, CIR 
took to the electorate, cosponsoring the Michigan “Civil Rights 
Initiative,” by which the state’s voters acted to abolish the use of 
aƥrmative action; this ballot initiative was ultimately upheld by the 
Supreme Court.29 It is clear that purposive groups across ideologies 
have successfully coordinated legislation and litigation projects to 
                                                     
24. Julia Preston, A Professor Fights Illegal Immigration One Court at a 
Time, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2009, at A10 (reviewing cases brought by Kris Kobach). 
CEO looks for cases and assists in identifying issues, while CIR uses staff attorneys 
and volunteer counsel to undertake litigation. Id. 
25. CTR. FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT 2009: 20TH
ANNIVERSARY 7 (2009), https://www.cir-usa.org/articles/cir_ar_2009.pdf. 
26. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 934 (5th Cir. 1996) (striking down 
college admissions policy). See generally Michael A. Olivas, Constitutional 
Criteria: The Social Science and Common Law of Admissions Decisions in Higher 
Education, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1065, 1104-14 (1997). 
27. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343-44 (2003) (upholding use of 
race in college admissions); see also Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 
2411, 2421 (2013) (upholding use of race). 
28. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316-17 (1978) 
(striking down use of quotas in admissions, but upholding use of race). 
29. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and 
Immigrant Rights and Fight for Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 
S. Ct. 1623, 1638 (2014) (upholding state voter ban on affirmative action). 
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secure their aims and that they can call upon a number of lawyers 
and law firms for support and litigation resources.  
These dueling and competing interests have had convergence 
on messaging, language, and strategic reliance upon Supreme Court 
litigation, but the thermodynamics of such purposive civil rights 
agendas also have similar structural complexities that are the focus 
of this project, particularly in the trial tactics and civil rights 
practices that constitute their reasons for existing. Here, I identify 
several such issues and draw from the growing literature on high-
stakes litigation as the fulcrum on which civil rights cases turn.  
In a nutshell, there have developed a number of seemingly 
arcane but fundamental features of exactly which group of the many 
gets to claim an issue as its own and undertake the path to court(s). 
As the number of purposive organizations has grown, so have the 
centripetal forces at play in controlling the crowded pathways to 
litigation and, equally important, who gets to create and engage in 
the discursive narrative so essential to advancing civil rights, 
however defined. As the country sorts through these competing 
messages in a more-connected polity, unexpected developments have 
arisen that threaten the alliances and coalitions that underpin the 
more-Manichean world of civil rights projects. When combined with 
the stalemates evident in a polarized Congress and electorate, it is 
not always clear how existing structures will regularly yield 
efficacious results.  
I use several brief case studies of one such civil rights group, 
MALDEF,30 as a purposive exemplar of litigation where unclear 
                                                     
30. For such an important organization, there are only a small number of 
studies of MALDEF, and surprisingly in 2015, no full-length books or histories of 
the organization. One such study is DAVID A. BADILLO, MALDEF AND THE 
EVOLUTION OF LATINO CIVIL RIGHTS (2005). As I have noted in several references, I 
have undertaken archival studies of individual MALDEF cases, but have not 
attempted a comprehensive organizational history. As I researched this project, I 
have, to my disappointment, discovered how little serious historical work there is on 
the various purposive litigation organizations other than that focused on the LDF 
and Brown v. Board. Some of the better exceptions include social science analysis, 
but still, very little historical work or detailed archival scholarship. See Stephen L. 
Wasby, Civil Rights Litigation by Organizations: Constraints and Choices, 68 J.
AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 337 (1985); Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, 
Funding the Cause: How Public Interest Law Organizations Fund Their Activities 
and Why It Matters for Social Change, 39 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 62 (2014); Holly J. 
McCammon & Allison R. McGrath, Litigating Change? Social Movements and the 
Court System, 9 SOC. COMPASS 128 (2015). In addition to being a useful piece on 
organizational issues, the McCammon and McGrath article ends with a wide-
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narratives and the resultant uncertainties can lead to trial tactics that 
were occasionally at cross-purposes, dooming the minority plaintiff 
claims against certain governmental policies and practices. First, the 
technical resources needed for trials require a large investment in the 
basic tools of litigation: experienced and committed counsel; deep 
pockets for research support, data analysis, and technical assistance; 
and the various other litigation costs for experts, trial costs, and 
miscellaneous resources. In almost every circumstance, the 
government or defendants will have deeper pockets, more media 
outlets for controlling the message, and more substantial resources. 
Government almost always enjoys the home-court advantage. 
As MALDEF matured and exerted more control over its 
purposive civil rights litigation undertaken on behalf of Latino 
communities and political interests, the issues became more nuanced, 
including tussles over literal control over a claim, such as who would 
be the named plaintiff(s), would serve as the lead counsel, would 
appear as the public face, and would determine the strategic direction 
of the case in chief. In addition, controlling the technical and 
administrative issues after litigation can also be uncertain and 
contingent: Who gets to settle a claim, to mediate or arbitrate a 
dispute, to agree to the implementation of a remedy, and to collect 
attorney’s fees? Who gets to claim the victory or shield the loss? In 
all these cases, MALDEF has been involved in varying degrees and 
exerted more or less control contingent upon a number of factors that 
show the inherent difficulty in maintaining control over a case where 
multiple players and civil rights interests are involved, each 
exercising its own organizational and client interests. 
II. KEYES AND TO A LESSER DEGREE, RODRIGUEZ
Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver was an unusual case in 
that it originated in Denver, Colorado, and was a school 
desegregation case where its southwestern geography was in play—
not merely the traditional line drawing, school assignment policies, 
and child transportation issues—but its political geography and 
demography variant.31 In Denver, as in most southwestern cities, 
there were more Mexican American children in the school system 
                                                                                                               
ranging bibliography of salient articles, across many disciplines. McCammon & 
McGrath, supra, at 136-39.  
31. See 413 U.S. 189, 191-93 (1973).  
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than there were Black schoolchildren.32 In part, this case study 
reveals how the untraditional comprehensive case approach was a 
blind spot in the traditional Black–White binary legal theory that 
doomed the case, especially as it was originally undertaken without 
Latino legal involvement. In addition, MALDEF was not yet the 
major purposive legal organization it matured into in the next decade 
when it won more and more-significant voting rights and immigrant 
education Supreme Court cases. However, as Keyes began without 
enlisting its participation, MALDEF had already undertaken Tenth 
Circuit education litigation in neighboring New Mexico and was 
building its organizational capacity;33 therefore, this failure of White 
Denver lawyers to incorporate a Mexican American theory of the 
Denver case contributed to its failed litigation strategy. 
There is always a backstory to a complex lawsuit, one that 
clarifies why the case was brought and, equally importantly, who 
brought it. By many readings, Keyes34 was the one that got away, sort 
of like San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez35 got 
away. In Keyes, White private firm lawyers and Black litigators 
brought in from the LDF overreached in retrying Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education36 in the Southwest and failed to 
involve Mexican American interests in a school district that was 
more Latino than it was African American.37 Even as they were wed 
in an arranged and adversarial relationship, and after MALDEF was 
allowed to intervene into their case, the Mexican American remedial 
plan for language instruction was largely adopted by the district 
court, and it repudiated the desegregation shibboleth originally 
pursued by the plaintiff lawyers. When the U.S. Supreme Court 
remanded the case after vacating the plan, the Denver school district 
board was given a free hand in fashioning its own remedy, one not 
agreed to by the plaintiffs.38
The Supreme Court, even as it vacated the district court’s 
remedial plan that had included bilingual education instructional 
programs for “Hispano” children, noted what could have been, given 
the similar racial histories of the two communities in the Southwest 
or areas with substantial numbers of Mexican Americans: 
                                                     
32. Id. at 195.  
33. See Serna v. Portales Mun. Schs., 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974). 
34. 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
35. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
36. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).  
37. See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 195, 197, 200-01.  
38. See id. at 213.  
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Before turning to the primary question we decide today, a word must be 
said about the District Court’s method of defining a “segregated” school. 
Denver is a tri-ethnic, as distinguished from a bi-racial, community. The 
overall racial and ethnic composition of the Denver public schools is 66 
Anglo, 14% Negro, and 20% Hispano. The District Court in assessing the 
question of de jure segregation in the core city schools, preliminarily 
resolved that Negroes and Hispanos should not be placed in the same 
category to establish the segregated character of a school. Later, in 
determining the schools that were likely to produce an inferior educational 
opportunity, the court concluded that a school would be considered 
inferior only if it had “a concentration of either Negro or Hispano students 
in the general area of 70 to 75 percent.” We intimate no opinion whether 
the District Court’s 70%-to-75% requirement was correct. The District 
Court used those figures to signify educationally inferior schools, and 
there is no suggestion in the record that those same figures were or would 
be used to define a “segregated” school in the de jure context. What is or 
is not a segregated school will necessarily depend on the facts of each 
particular case. In addition to the racial and ethnic composition of a 
school’s student body, other factors, such as the racial and ethnic 
composition of faculty and staff and the community and administration 
attitudes toward the school, must be taken into consideration. The District 
Court has recognized these specific factors as elements of the definition of 
a “segregated” school, and we may therefore infer that the court will 
consider them again on remand. 
We conclude, however, that the District Court erred in separating 
Negroes and Hispanos for purposes of defining a “segregated” school. We 
have held that Hispanos constitute an identifiable class for purposes of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, the District Court recognized this in 
classifying predominantly Hispano schools as “segregated” schools in 
their own right. But there is also much evidence that in the Southwest 
Hispanos and Negroes have a great many things in common. The United 
States Commission on Civil Rights has recently published two Reports on 
Hispano education in the Southwest. Focusing on students in the States of 
Arizona, California, Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas, the Commission 
concluded that Hispanos suffer from the same educational inequities as 
Negroes and American Indians. In fact, the District Court itself recognized 
that “[o]ne of the things which the Hispano has in common with the Negro 
is economic and cultural deprivation and discrimination.” This is 
agreement that, though of different origins Negroes and Hispanos in 
Denver suffer identical discrimination in treatment when compared with 
the treatment afforded Anglo students. In that circumstance, we think 
petitioners are entitled to have schools with a combined predominance of 
Negroes and Hispanos included in the category of “segregated” schools.39
Despite the clear historical and current marginalization of these 
children and the political communities in the administration and 
governance of the schools in Denver, Mexican American 
                                                     
39. Id. at 195-98 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (citations 
omitted). 
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instructional and pedagogical needs, especially for English Language 
Learners (as bilingual Spanish–English children have come to be 
known), were portrayed as different than were the needs of the 
African American children, whose advocates were more concerned 
about racial isolation and desegregative policies. Even the Supreme 
Court could only imagine how a better and more successful case 
would have been fashioned with a more comprehensive and inclusive 
litigation strategy, one where the different racial and language 
interests could have been worked out by the various parties, rather 
than being pitted against each other with competing theories of the 
case.  
Details from the case reveal that the lead lawyers actually 
attempted fitfully to involve and co-opt Latinos, if not Latino 
lawyers or organizations, into their plans when the local community 
publicly began to agitate, but no coordinated efforts emerged as 
MALDEF disagreed with the strategic direction of the case and so 
sought to intervene late in the game.40 This uncoordinated tactic did 
allow Mexican Americans to advance a comprehensive instructional 
remedy, one favoring language accommodations that was accepted 
by the lower court, but only to be overturned by the Supreme Court.41
Whether or not one accepts this narrative of two groups being played 
by the school district and leading to a failed plaintiff instructional 
remedy, Keyes was a disappointing and difficult loss when the 
Milliken v. Bradley Detroit litigation ended comprehensive 
desegregation remedies for all intents and purposes.42
And while courts of all levels knew the difference between 
White and Black litigants as opposing parties in civil rights cases, 
they had not always known how to contextualize Mexican 
Americans in the universal mix of more racial shadings and 
histories—this, notwithstanding the long history of Mexican 
American challenges in their own history, extending over many 
years. Keyes historian and legal scholar Tom I. Romero, II has noted: 
                                                     
40. In a long analysis of Keyes and contemporaneous MALDEF cases, I 
outline the failure of the original lawyers to involve Mexican American interests or 
lawyers. See Michael A. Olivas, From a “Legal Organization of Militants” into a 
“Law Firm for the Latino Community”: MALDEF and the Purposive Cases of 
Keyes, Rodriguez, and Plyler, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 1151, 1153 n.8 (2013). 
41. Id. at 1153 n.8, 1158-62.
42. See 418 U.S. 717, 744-45 (1974) (refusing to employ cross-district or 
cross-jurisdictional remedies). For a contrarian view, see Kevin Brown, Reflections 
on Justice Kennedy’s Opinion in Parents Involved: Why Fifty Years of Experience 
Shows Kennedy Is Right, 59 S.C. L. REV. 735, 738 (2008). 
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MALDEF continued to push a litigation agenda to force courts to 
recognize the distinct racialization and color positioning of Mexican 
Americans. In so doing, MALDEF tested the legal boundaries of a 
potentially more expansive color line in jurisprudence and legal discourse 
by investing in the non-Whiteness and non-Blackness of the Mexican 
American community. Though courts would consistently relegate Mexican 
Americans to an in-between racial and ethnic space, a claim and 
commitment to “brownness” would continue to animate Mexican 
American legal claims to equality into the [twenty-first c]entury.43
But to prevail on an abstract theory meant little to MALDEF 
lawyers absent traction on a viable and efficacious result for its 
Mexican American clients. As the organization’s lead education 
lawyer noted at the time:  
Arguments over bilingual education invariably turn into debates about 
“success” as reflected in research findings. Putting aside the inherent 
weaknesses in much educational research, an additional factor ought to be 
weighed in such discussions. It is important to understand that a bilingual 
education program merely seeks to provide [limited-English-proficient 
(LEP)] students with what others take for granted, namely, 
comprehensible instruction and English proficiency. While it is correct to 
hold bilingual education programs to high degrees of rigor and scrutiny, it 
should not obscure the fact that the adoption of such a program merely is 
the first step in assuring educational success for LEP students. “Success” 
will not be achieved unless those additional components of any effective 
school instructional program are made part of bilingual programs.44  
This requirement had been undermined historically when 
Anglo school boards and educators used the existence of Latino 
schoolchildren to be traded off in demographic measures against 
African American children, creating a false racial calculus in mixed 
school districts.45 This bad faith measure was made possible in part 
by lawyers employing the “other-White” or “class apart” legal 
strategies that had mousetrapped attorneys representing Mexican 
American children’s interests and had thwarted desegregative efforts 
by Mexican American communities for many years. They had 
reacted against Mexican-only schools in inferior situations or against 
all-White juries being deemed adequate by governmental bodies for 
                                                     
43. Tom I. Romero, II, MALDEF and the Legal Investment in a Multi-
Colored America, 18 BERKLEY LA RAZA L.J. 135, 146 (2007) (footnote omitted). 
44. Peter D. Roos, Implementation of the Federal Bilingual Education 
Mandate: The Keyes Case as a Paradigm, 1 LA RAZA L. J. 257, 276 (1986). 
45. See, e.g., Steven H. Wilson, Brown over “Other White”: Mexican 
Americans’ Legal Arguments and Litigation Strategy in School Desegregation 
Lawsuits, 21 LAW & HIST. REV. 145 (2003); Jorge C. Rangel & Carlos M. Alcala, 
Project Report: De Jure Segregation of Chicanos in Texas Schools, 7 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 307, 342-48 (1972). 
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trying Mexican American defendants—on the spurious grounds that 
Mexican Americans were anthropologically or culturally “White” 
and so were actually being judged by their racial peers.46 Whatever 
the classification, Mexican Americans were caught in a racial 
narrative that ignored Jaime Crow realities on vague racial 
equivalence theories and practices.47
Concerning the Keyes remedial plan, MALDEF’s lawyer Peter 
Roos wrote: 
The trial of a language rights case, like most other complex civil rights 
litigation, is properly viewed in two phases. The first phase is the 
“liability” phase in which the plaintiffs have the burden of establishing 
that the practices of the educational authority violate their rights under 
law. Once that is established, and the court so rules, a “remedial” phase is 
entered. Drawing upon the practice that has evolved in desegregation 
litigation, the second phase typically involves the presentation of a 
remedial plan by the school district, followed by an opportunity for the 
plaintiffs to question its adequacy and to present their own plan should the 
school district proposal fail. 
It is appropriate at the remedial phase to include matters in a plan whose 
absence might not trigger liability in the first instance. This may be 
necessary to make the plaintiffs whole, and to remove “root and branch” 
barriers to educational success that have evolved through the unlawful 
practice. The one limitation is that the remedy must bear some reasonable 
relationship to the wrong found at the liability phase. 
As we approached this second phase of the case, we were confronted 
with a decision that is common to this litigation: Do you continue with a 
                                                     
46. There is a growing historical and legal literature on early- and mid-
twentieth century Mexican American resistance to their legal subordination, 
particularly in education, but also in other areas of civil engagement and criminal 
law. See, e.g., RICHARD R. VALENCIA, CHICANO STUDENTS AND THE COURTS: THE 
MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL STRUGGLE FOR EDUCATIONAL EQUALITY (2008) 
(education); PHILIPPA STRUM, MENDEZ V. WESTMINSTER: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 
AND MEXICAN-AMERICAN RIGHTS (2010) (education); Kristi L. Bowman, Pursuing 
Educational Opportunities for Latino/a Students, 88 N.C. L. REV. 911 (2010) 
(education); Michael A. Olivas, Hernandez v. Texas: A Litigation History, in
“COLORED MEN” AND “HOMBRES AQUÍ”: HERNANDEZ V. TEXAS AND THE EMERGENCE 
OF MEXICAN-AMERICAN LAWYERING 209 (Michael A. Olivas ed., 2006) (jury 
selection); IGNACIO M. GARCÍA, WHITE BUT NOT EQUAL: MEXICAN AMERICANS, JURY 
DISCRIMINATION, AND THE SUPREME COURT (2009) (jury selection); CYNTHIA E.
OROZCO, NO MEXICANS, WOMEN, OR DOGS ALLOWED: THE RISE OF THE MEXICAN 
AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2009) (civil rights). 
47. Ian Haney López & Michael A. Olivas, Jim Crow, Mexican Americans, 
and the Anti-Subordination Constitution: The Story of Hernandez v. Texas, in RACE 
LAW STORIES 273 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon W. Carbado eds., 2008); Michael A. 
Olivas, Review Essay—The Arc of Triumph and the Agony of Defeat: Mexican 
Americans and the Law, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 354 (2010). 
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formal litigation posture or do you attempt to reach an agreement on the 
remedy? We made the determination that an agreed-upon plan was a 
preferable solution and that a return to court should occur only if the 
negotiations failed. At the heart of this decision was the belief that the 
school district would be more likely to faithfully implement a plan for 
which they felt some ownership. Conversely, it was felt that a court-
imposed plan might be followed to the letter but without the spirit to make 
it truly work. We thus approached the school district and the court with the 
proposal that we work toward such a plan with certain fairly demanding 
time frames. If negotiations did not bear fruit within these time frames, it 
was understood that we would feel compelled to invoke the court’s 
processes. The school district and the court agreed.48
Legal scholar Rachel F. Moran has also commented on the 
structure of the various education cases leading to the Keyes
litigation and concluded that in effect the two minority groups were 
counterpoised against each other by each maintaining different 
theories of the case, not only different but at cross-purposes. She 
cited the school board attorney as inevitably attempting to play one 
interest off the other: 
The first challenge presented by Keyes was reconciling the mandate to 
desegregate the Denver school district with the contemporaneous effort to 
implement bilingual education programs. The language claims in Keyes
were brought only after a far-reaching desegregation decree had been 
issued. [However, MALDEF] mobilized precisely because the decree 
threatened to destroy bilingual education programs in Denver. 
The [Denver school board attorney Michael] Jackson and [Peter] Roos 
[viewpoints] differ markedly in their treatment of the relationship between 
bilingual education and desegregation. Jackson states that the school 
district was concerned that the court’s evaluation of instructional programs 
for LEP and [non-English-proficient (NEP)] children would be prejudiced
by a previous adverse holding in the desegregation litigation. According to 
Jackson, his client[, the Denver school board,] believed that: 
[T]he earlier finding that the school district violated the 
Constitution [in conjunction with the desegregation decree] 
would weigh heavily in the court’s consideration of the evidence 
[regarding an entitlement to bilingual education]. Our strategy 
centered on impressing upon the court the need to consider the 
language rights issue independently from any prior history of 
segregation. Ultimately, this proved to be the most crucial and 
least successful [school board strategy].  
Jackson concludes that the board did not succeed in dissociating the 
language issue from the desegregation case, citing the district court’s 
                                                     
48. Roos, supra note 44, at 268-69 (footnotes omitted). 
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refusal to speculate on how the language claims would have been resolved 
if they had not been part of the desegregation case.49
Professor Moran also determined that these antagonisms arose 
at least in part due to the complex structural differences in 
perspective between those lawyers on the inside defending the school 
district and those on the outside who were motivated by their clients’ 
historic involvement in this case and others before it: “Clearly, in 
Keyes, prospective implementation of the legal mandate was as 
critical for the intervenors as [was] demonstrating past violations.”50
In her recounting of this rich and complex Denver story, the 
backstory was a mix of the civil procedure inherent of complex 
litigation and its political equations, especially who gets to make the 
decisions among the various competing parties and how complex 
case management virtually always favors the governmental insiders, 
such as the Denver school board, who may lose at the front end but 
who often prevail in the remedy and implementation stages. 
Sometimes, if they do prevail, it is not only due to these structural 
advantages and deeper pockets, but also to all the various tools of 
complex litigation: better access to statistical data, many institutional 
players, and the large scale political and media access residing in 
governmental organizations. 
In Keyes, MALDEF played a surprisingly significant role in the 
case but intervened so late after the game was afoot that its curricular 
tactics did not mesh or coordinate with the alternative and original 
litigation plan, leaving MALDEF as the resented and late-intervening 
party guest.  
III. RODRIGUEZ: ONCE MORE INTO THE BREACH
To make matters worse, soon after in Rodriguez, the U.S. 
Supreme Court could not resolve the exceedingly complex and rival 
economic models of school finance (the field was “unsettled and 
disputed” and “this Court’s lack of specialized knowledge and 
experience counsels against premature interference with the 
informed judgments made at the state and local levels”).51 It then 
deferred to the state and local school districts by declaring that 
                                                     
49. Rachel F. Moran, Foreword—The Lessons of Keyes: How Do You 
Translate “the American Dream”?, 1 LA RAZA L.J. 195, 199-200 (1986) (footnotes 
omitted) (quoting Michael Jackson, Bilingual Education Litigation in Denver: The 
School District’s Perspective, 1 LA RAZA L.J. 250, 252 (1986)). 
50. Id. at 202. 
51. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 23, 42 (1973). 
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education was not a fundamental right, choking off any remedies or 
resolution.52 The Rodriguez case was brought in San Antonio, where 
virtually all the children were Chicano, but the legal strategy 
decision was made not to argue the case in racial or ethnic terms and, 
once again, was undertaken without active involvement of MALDEF 
in the original suit. (The slight was even greater than it had been in 
Denver, as MALDEF was established in San Antonio and, at the 
time, was headquartered in its founding city.) 
And in Rodriguez, a different set of Anglo lawyers and the 
LDF confusingly disagreed on their own theory of the case: In the 
briefs supporting the plaintiffs, the LDF argued that the harm was 
one of racial discrimination, which was not the theory being pursued 
by lead local attorney Arthur Gochman, who had eschewed racial 
terminology as his strategic approach.53
Gochman’s tactical choice even led the LDF to mischaracterize 
and misstate the district court’s holding, noting that the Rodriguez
“claim based on race was specifically upheld” by the trial court, 
when this was not correct.54 This inaccuracy also led them to aver 
that the state’s program of school finance was unconstitutionally 
racially discriminatory and that Gochman’s clients (mostly Mexican 
Americans) had inherently and orthogonally claimed racial 
discrimination: “[T]he money differences proved by plaintiffs in this 
case are material enough to warrant judicial intervention in light of 
their relationship to the other factors present, including race and 
poverty” and, tellingly, “Plaintiffs are all Mexican-Americans. They 
claimed relief as and for Mexican Americans.”55
                                                     
52. See id. at 37-38. 
53. For a detailed study of the complex case, see Michael Heise, The Story 
of San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez: School Finance, Local 
Control, and Constitutional Limits, in EDUCATION LAW STORIES 51, 53-56 (Michael 
A. Olivas & Ronna Greff Schneider eds., 2008). Although MALDEF entered an 
amicus in this case, on the side of the plaintiff children, it played a subordinate role. 
Attorney Gochman argued the SCOTUS case by himself, and the organization was 
undergoing dramatic personnel upheavals, and had not yet become the authoritative 
purposive organization is was to become. Its influence, as can be seen, was minimal.  
54. See Brief for NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc. as Amicus 
Curiae at 7-8, San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (No. 
71-1332) [hereinafter Brief for LDF]; see also Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 281 (W.D. Tex. 1971) (per curiam) (holding that the method 
of state financing for public elementary and secondary education deprived plaintiffs 
equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
55. Brief for LDF, supra note 54, at 7, 14 (emphasis omitted). Ironically, 
this charge was the mirror image of that raised by MALDEF in its attempt to 
intervene in Keyes. These bookend cases reveal as no others why it was virtually 
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It is not evident that the Court would have taken the bait even if 
the parties had forged a single and coherent narrative, but having an 
uncoordinated approach inevitably blunted the legal argument and 
did not sharply focus attention on the plaintiff’s exact claims and 
proposed remedies. Thus, Mexican interests had been ignored in 
Keyes and mischaracterized as racial in Rodriguez when in fact they 
were linguistic and curricular in the former and economic and fiscal 
in the latter—in effect, losing by both fire and ice in their earliest 
Supreme Court civil rights cases. 
IV. PLYLER AND CASE MANAGEMENT BY MALDEF 
When Texas passed the state statute that gave rise to Plyler v. 
Doe, the first challenge was brought by a Houston private lawyer in 
an Austin state court, as the state capitol was the jurisdiction of the 
implementation of the law.56 In Hernandez v. Houston ISD, the state 
court held that the State was within its rights to exclude or to charge 
tuition to undocumented children.57 When MALDEF filed its 
challenge in the Tyler federal district court before Judge Justice, it 
proceeded without reference to the original state case.58 The original 
Hernandez decision had not led to similar state court litigation, as 
MALDEF and other lawyers filed in federal courts rather than 
litigating in a number of hostile state venues and in front of elected 
state judges.59
When MALDEF won the Tyler federal trial, the issue of its 
potential impact upon other Texas school districts naturally arose and 
prompted more than a dozen federal lawsuits, eventually forcing 
MALDEF to mesh its efforts, including coordinating its response to 
                                                                                                               
impossible for the LDF and MALDEF to reconcile each other’s claims and bring 
cases jointly, where there were adverse or inconsistent African American and 
Mexican American claims and remedies. 
56. 457 U.S. 202, 206 (1982). In this section, I draw upon earlier research 
conducted for Michael A. Olivas, Plyler v. Doe, the Education of Undocumented 
Children, and the Polity, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 197 (David A. Martin & Peter H. 
Schuck eds., 2005) [hereinafter STORIES] and MICHAEL A. OLIVAS, NO
UNDOCUMENTED CHILD LEFT BEHIND: PLYLER V. DOE AND THE EDUCATION OF 
UNDOCUMENTED SCHOOLCHILDREN (2012) [hereinafter NO UNDOCUMENTED CHILD].
57. Hernandez v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 558 S.W.2d 121, 125 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1977). I have also conducted several discussions with Houston attorney and the 
counsel of record Peter Williamson, who had generously filled in many of the 
unpublished details of the state case backstory. 
58. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 569-74.  
59. Hernandez, 558 S.W.2d at 121.  
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the Plyler appeals filed by the Tyler School District and the State of 
Texas, with over a dozen challenges blooming in other parts of the 
state, especially in the State’s largest school district, Houston ISD.60
In September 1978, a California-based public interest law firm, 
headed by civil rights lawyer (and South African immigrant) Peter 
Schey as lead counsel, filed a lawsuit in federal court in Houston, 
including as defendants the State of Texas, the Texas Governor, the 
Texas Education Agency (the state agency that governed K-12 public 
education in the State), and its Commissioner.61 Eventually, all these 
fresh cases were consolidated into In re Alien Children and tried in 
the Southern District of Texas in Houston before Judge Woodrow 
Seals in a month-long trial.62
Whereas MALDEF had narrowly focused upon Texas 
Education Code § 21.031 and solely upon the Tyler schools, the 
newer cases were brought by a variety of attorneys on many fronts, 
relying upon several theories, hoping that they could repeat the 
MALDEF Tyler victory, even with different facts and school 
circumstances. At this point, it became crucial that the various 
plaintiffs’ lawyers coordinate their efforts, inasmuch as the defendant 
schools had deep pockets, state attorneys, and other tactical and 
resource advantages, especially the ability to outlast private groups. 
Although MALDEF had convinced the United States to intervene in 
its case on the side of the alien schoolchildren, over the long haul, 
the federal government could not be wholly relied upon in civil 
rights cases, as its interests could change depending upon the 
administration in office. In fact, a version of this scenario happened 
when the Carter Administration lost its reelection bid to Ronald 
Reagan.63
In May 1979, after Plyler had been decided at the trial level but 
before the consolidated In re Alien Children was to go to trial in 
Houston, counsel for the plaintiffs in the case before Judge Seals 
requested that MALDEF arrange to fold its efforts into their case.64
MALDEF demurred, seeking to control its own case and to manage 
                                                     
60. Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 573 (E.D. Tex. 1978). 
61. In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544, 550 (1980).  
62. Id. at 544. 
63. See generally Olivas, supra note 56, at 207-08 (background on behind-
the-scenes maneuvering). For an extremely useful telling of the interactions of the 
SCOTUS justices in the case, see Linda Greenhouse, What Would Justice Powell 
Do?: The ‘Alien Children’ Case and the Meaning of Equal Protection, 25 CONST.
COMMENT. 29, 32-35 (2008). 
64. Olivas, supra note 56, at 205.  
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the appeal: The organization noted that it “felt ‘quite strongly that 
consolidation would not be in the best interests of our mutual 
efforts.’”65 Of course, the dozen other cases had their own 
differentiated fact patterns and resource variables, and their lawyers 
were understandably worried that unless the cases were consolidated, 
the relief in Plyler might not extend beyond that small district.  
This approach mirrored the trial strategy of the LDF on the 
cases leading to Brown, where Thurgood Marshall and his colleagues 
carefully picked their fights, each case—K-12 and higher 
education—incrementally building upon the previous cases.66
MALDEF’s General Counsel Vilma Martinez had originally worked 
at the LDF with Marshall’s former colleague and successor, Jack 
Greenberg, and she clearly valued an overarching strategic vision 
and focused tactical litigation agenda.67
Although MALDEF’s lawyers on the ground in Texas would 
not agree to combine forces with the lawyers in the other cases at the 
crucial early stages, this matter was taken out of their hands when the 
                                                     
65. Id. (describing the correspondence between Roos and Houston local 
counsel, declining to consolidate cases at that point). 
66.  
Although Brown concerned primary and secondary public 
education, the road to Brown ran through several higher education cases in 
which black students were denied admission into predominantly white 
colleges and universities. In these cases, the relevant universities crucially 
influenced place as states physically excluded blacks from these white 
public spaces. In response, states erected black colleges, started black law 
schools, paid for scholarships for blacks to attend colleges or professional 
schools in other states, or required blacks to sit, eat, and study in 
designated segregated areas within the university’s facilities.
Michael A. Olivas, Brown and the Desegregative Ideal: Location, Race, and 
College Attendance Policies, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 391, 392 (2005) (citations 
omitted). 
67. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Brown v. 
Bd. of Educ. of Topeka (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). In an example of how 
cases can become styled, the several cases having been brought on this subject were 
consolidated into the case in chief, in alphabetical order of the plaintiffs. See 
generally Leland Ware, The Story of Brown v. Board of Education: The Long Road 
to Racial Equality, in STORIES, supra note 56, at 19, 36-40. A similar back story 
occurred in the same-sex marriage matter that became Obergefell v. Hodges: “The 
court will hear arguments on April 28 concerning the four cases, but because 
Obergefell’s suit has the lowest case number, the court, per its tradition, has lumped 
everything under his legal citation.” See Michael S. Rosenwald, How Jim Obergefell 
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defendant State of Texas requested consolidation so that it could 
concentrate upon a common defense instead of being Gulliver tied 
down by the growing challenges.68 When Judge Seals, as had Judge 
Justice before him, issued a favorable decision on the merits, the 
plaintiff schoolchildren prevailed on all their claims.69 Soon after, 
Judge Justice’s Plyler decision was affirmed at the Circuit in October 
1980, and in May 1981, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the 
matter.70 At this point, the Fifth Circuit issued a summary affirmance 
of the consolidated Houston cases, and the Supreme Court combined 
the appeals of both cases by Texas under the styling of Plyler v. Doe,
handing Peter Roos the chief case over Peter Schey’s previously 
joined cases.71 Having developed fuller records and armed with Fifth 
Circuit wins, the two Peters worked out an agreement to divide the 
oral arguments down the middle, but with MALDEF’s case leading 
the way. 
Until the Supreme Court arguments, Roos shored up political 
support with Carter Administration officials and with the new 
Reagan Administration officials in January of 1981.72 Although the 
new Administration did not enter an amicus brief on the side of the 
plaintiffs (as had the earlier Democrat lawyers), their lawyers took 
no position on the crucial equal protection issue.73 Fortunately for the 
plaintiffs, it did not seek to overturn the lower court decisions; rather, 
the unaligned amicus brief stressed the primacy of the federal 
government in immigration, a position that actually benefitted the 
MALDEF theory of the case.74 On June 15, 1982, the Court ruled 5–
4 for the children.75 In September 1982, the Court denied the Texas 
petitions to rehear the case, and the matter was over.76  
                                                     
68. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 209 (1982).  
69. In re Alien Children Educ. Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544, 597 (1980). 
70. Id.  
71. Texas v. Certain Named and Unnamed Undocumented Alien Children, 
452 U.S. 937, 937 (1981) (noting probable jurisdiction). The Plyler merits decision 
spelled out the complex consolidation history. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 207-10.
72. See Olivas, supra note 56, at 207-08.  
73. Plyler v. Doe, THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE, http://www.civilrights. 
org/equal-opportunity/court-decisions/plyler-v-doe.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2015) 
(“Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Reynolds, and Edwin S. 
Kneedler filed a brief for the United States in No. 80-1934 and for the United States 
as amicus curiae in No. 80-1538.”).
74. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in No. 80-1538 and Brief 
for the United States in No. 80-1934, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (Nos. 80-
1538, 80-1934), 1981 WL 390001, at *5.  
75. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230.  
76. Plyler v. Doe, 458 U.S. 1131, 1131 (1982) (denying motion to rehear). 
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More than five years had passed since the issue had first 
appeared on the MALDEF radar screen, and the disciplined case 
management and overarching strategic vision enabled them to 
control the centripetal forces that threatened Plyler at every turn. The 
cases had a sympathetic narrative in the anonymous client children 
and a state statute that never had had its own counter-story, 
sympathetic and helpful government officials at all levels, a 
potentially catastrophic change in federal administration that did not 
sabotage the plans, the ability to keep the complex cases focused on 
track, and the right array of judges hearing the cases as they wended 
their way through the system. This issue could have foundered at any 
one of the many turns, winding up like Hernandez in state court or 
like Keyes and Rodriguez, even more complex federal cases where 
MALDEF was not in control of its litigation strategy or theories of 
the cases.  
Plyler was always a close call: The decision was surprising, 
inasmuch as it followed the hapless experience of both Keyes and 
Rodriguez. Plyler never commanded widespread constitutional 
attention or gained the weight accorded other such doctrinal 
developments. It has been widely understood to be sui generis, as 
high moral ground, but limited in its application. Peter Schuck, 
among the case’s most thoughtful observers, has noted that:
Some of the manifest difficulties of devising a new constitutional order in 
an area of law that has long defied one are revealed in Plyler v. Doe, in 
which the Court felt obliged to turn conventional legal categories and 
precedents inside out in order to reach a morally appealing result.77
Following Plyler, and several other Supreme Court and other 
court victories, MALDEF was clearly in command of its own 
domain to the extent that purposive organizations are ever masters of 
their cases.78 MALDEF continued to carve out major civil rights 
victories, including efforts to unravel the wins by additional 
legislation or litigation. The most notable and important effort in 
shoring up earlier court wins was the defeat of Proposition 187, the 
California anti-immigrant state ballot measure, which was struck 
down by a federal judge in League of United Latin American 
Citizens (LULAC) v. Wilson, a case that was mooted when the 
California governor reached a settlement, avoiding an appeal to the 
                                                     
77. Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 82-83 (1984). 
78. A useful study of the rise of MALDEF’s influence during this period is 
by a political scientist. See BAIRD, supra note 5, at 73-82. 
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U.S. Supreme Court.79 This was another case in which MALDEF’s 
successful litigation strategy was aided by good luck in the changing 
of an administration, this one of restrictionist California Governor 
Pete Wilson, who ran a short-lived presidential campaign on anti-
immigration themes and who was no longer in state office when the 
settlement talks after LULAC commenced.80
V. SUBSEQUENT CASES AND SCOTUS PRACTICE
In 2003, the Texas Legislature passed a redistricting plan that 
replaced an earlier one created by a federal judge, based upon 2000 
census data.81 MALDEF and Democrat Party challengers argued the 
plan was unconstitutional and that it violated § 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act (VRA) by diluting racial minority voting and that it was 
designed to maximize partisan Republican advantage in two different 
districts. Following another VRA case, the Court accepted cert. for 
League of Latin American Citizens v. Perry, combining challenges to 
two congressional districts—one challenge undertaken by MALDEF 
and the other by the Democratic Party, where the Court argument 
logistics once again had to be negotiated.82 The Court consolidated 
Texas v. Perry, Jackson v. Perry, and GI Forum v. Perry, and noted 
the complexities of the cases they had joined83 and their relationship 
to recent VRA decisions: 
Soon after Texas enacted Plan 1374C, appellants challenged it in court, 
alleging a host of constitutional and statutory violations. Initially, the 
District Court entered judgment against appellants on all their claims. 
Appellants sought relief here and, after their jurisdictional statements were 
filed, this Court issued Vieth v. Jubelirer. Our order vacating the District 
Court judgment and remanding for consideration in light of Vieth was 
issued just weeks before the 2004 elections. On remand, the District Court, 
believing the scope of its mandate was limited to questions of political 
gerrymandering, again rejected appellants’ claims. [District] Judge Ward 
would have granted relief under the theory—presented to the court for the 
                                                     
79. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 131 F.3d 1297, 1301, 
1308-09 (9th Cir. 1997). 
80. See generally BAIRD, supra note 5, at 78-82 (noting different litigation 
strategies available to MALDEF and other litigants in LULAC and other immigrant-
rights cases). 
81. “To set out a proper framework for the cases, we first recount the 
history of the litigation and recent districting in Texas. An appropriate starting point 
is not the reapportionment in 2000 but the one from the census in 1990.” League of 
United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 410 (2006). 
82. Id.  
83. Id.  
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first time on remand—that mid-decennial redistricting violates the one-
person, one-vote requirement, but he concluded such an argument was not 
within the scope of the remand mandate.  
Based on two similar theories that address the mid-decade character of 
the 2003 redistricting, appellants now argue that Plan 1374C should be 
invalidated as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. In Davis v. 
Bandemer, the Court held that an equal protection challenge to a political 
gerrymander presents a justiciable case or controversy, but there was 
disagreement over what substantive standard to apply. That disagreement 
persists. A plurality of the Court in Vieth would have held such challenges 
to be nonjusticiable political questions, but a majority declined to do so. 
We do not revisit the justiciability holding but do proceed to examine 
whether appellants’ claims offer the Court a manageable, reliable measure 
of fairness for determining whether a partisan gerrymander violates the 
Constitution.84
In other words, the cases were complex and based upon raw 
partisan redistricting politics, as well as complicated and uncertain 
jurisdictional challenges. Nina Perales argued the MALDEF case in 
chief.85 No single theory of the consolidated cases was possible, and 
MALDEF’s case was congruent with, but different than the other 
case(s) with which it had become joined, and which were argued by 
an experienced private firm litigator who had earlier argued Supreme 
Court VRA cases and Lawrence v. Texas, striking down the Texas 
sodomy laws.86 In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the 
redistricting plans did not constitute a constitutional violation, but 
that one of the challenged districts, which snaked along a number of 
cities and areas, had been redrawn so that it violated the VRA by 
adversely affecting Mexican American voters.87 In this case, 
MALDEF’s challenge was upheld, while the other State plan 
redrawing a Dallas-area district and challenged by the Democratic 
Party’s lawyers was upheld.88 In a complex negotiation, the time was 
split by the appellees into challenges to the two different districts. 
When the smoke cleared, LULAC v. Perry also was a rare case where 
                                                     
84. Id. at 413-14 (citations omitted). 
85. Id. at 407. 
86. 539 U.S. 558, 561 (2003). The lawyer was Paul M. Smith. Id.
87. Perry, 548 U.S. at 442 (“[T]he totality of the circumstances 
demonstrates a § 2 violation. Even assuming Plan 1374C provides something close 
to proportional representation for Latinos, its troubling blend of politics and race—
and the resulting vote dilution of a group that was beginning to achieve § 2’s goal of 
overcoming prior electoral discrimination—cannot be sustained.”).
88. Id. at 447 (“We reject the statewide challenge to Texas’ redistricting as 
an unconstitutional political gerrymander and the challenge to the redistricting in the 
Dallas area as a violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act.”).
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Latino lawyers were on opposite sides of a case: MALDEF lawyer 
Nina Perales, a Puerto Rican, was on the MALDEF side, and 
Teodoro Cruz, a Cuban, argued on the State side.89 Ironically, 
although the Latino lawyers were on the opposite sides, both won 
their parts of their respective cases.90
The next VRA case in which MALDEF was in the driver’s seat 
turned out to have been the most complicated and disappointing 
example of repeat-player control of a case. In November 2004, 
Arizona passed Proposition 200, requiring additional identification 
for voting than had been required, which MALDEF determined 
violated not only the Constitution, but two federal statutes that 
controlled voting policies, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the 
National Voter Registration Act of 1993. These complex challenges 
to voter registration had become one of MALDEF’s purposive 
legislative and litigation priorities, as there was a general national 
trend by conservative interests to enact practices that negatively 
affected voter turnout for parties perceived to be leaning Democrat, 
and a number of these practices were being implemented by states 
and federal actors—including additional voter identification and 
complicated registration procedures that would make voting more 
difficult. Two challenges emerged to the Arizona statute, the lead 
plaintiffs Gonzalez,91 represented by MALDEF, and the Inter Tribal 
Council of Arizona plaintiffs (ITCA),92 represented by the Lawyer’s 
Committee and several other non-profit groups. The civil procedure 
of the cases was daunting, even as the federal trial court consolidated 
the cases. In addition to the complexity and the growing significance 
                                                     
89. Id. at 407. Cruz was subsequently elected to the United States Senate, 
representing Texas. Senators of the 114th Congress, UNITED STATES SENATE,
http://www.senate.gov/senators/contact/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2105). 
90. With the caveat that I have not been able to review all the SCOTUS 
cases argued on Puerto Rican issues, the first known Latina to argue before the 
United States Supreme Court appears to have been Miriam Naveria de Rodon, who 
argued Examining Board of Engineers, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 
426 U.S. 572 (1976), in 1975. Naviera de Rodon argued against Max Ramirez de 
Arellano, and both parties were on the brief. Id. at 574. I now believe this to be the 
first time two Latinos appeared on both sides of a Supreme Court case. This revises 
my earlier belief that LULAC v. Perry was the first such case. Flores de Otero is an 
interesting immigration case, well-known to immigration teachers. To an extent, 
Puerto Rican lawyers arguing Puerto Rican cases in the U.S. Supreme Court are a 
special category, but are no less important to the history of Latino/Latina lawyering. 
91. Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 387 (9th Cir. 2012) (Nina Perales, 
arguing for plaintiffs-appellants Jesus Gonzalez, et al.). 
92. Id. (Jon M. Greenbaum, arguing for plaintiffs-appellants The Inter 
Tribal Council of Arizona, et al.). 
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of the issues, the plaintiffs wanted to accelerate the resolution of the 
cases before the impending national elections: 
The District Court consolidated the cases and denied the plaintiffs’ 
motions for a preliminary injunction. A two-judge motions panel of the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit then enjoined Proposition 200 
pending appeal. We vacated that order and allowed the impending 2006 
election to proceed with the new rules in place. On remand, the Court of 
Appeals affirmed the District Court’s initial denial of a preliminary 
injunction as to respondents’ claim that the NVRA pre-empts Proposition 
200’s registration rules. The District Court then granted Arizona’s motion 
for summary judgment as to that claim. A panel of the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed in part but reversed as relevant here, holding that “Proposition 
200’s documentary proof of citizenship requirement conflicts with the 
NVRA’s text, structure, and purpose.” The en banc Court of Appeals 
agreed. We granted certiorari.93  
On the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, MALDEF’s Gonzalez 
v. Arizona became the Lawyers’ Committee’s Arizona, et al. v. Inter 
Tribal Council of Arizona, et al., in a complicated and confusing 
series of exchanges. As lead counsel for the case in chief, 
MALDEF’s Perales—who had successfully argued Gonzalez before 
the Ninth Circuit—would traditionally have argued the Supreme 
Court appeal, parsing the arguments and determining who would 
argue the case.94
When the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) evinced 
interest, the Deputy Solicitor General Sri Srinivasan entered the 
equation as amicus curiae in support of the respondent, MALDEF’s 
client, Gonzalez.95 This support automatically accorded the DOJ time 
in the argument, and the remaining time would, in the normal court 
of business, have been MALDEF’s choice, either with in-house staff 
counsel or outside counsel assigned to argue on its behalf. Inasmuch 
as she had successfully argued LULAC v. Perry, Perales had become 
one of the country’s premier VRA advocates and anticipated arguing 
the respondents’ case. But while Jon M. Greenbaum, the Lawyers’ 
                                                     
93. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2252-53 
(2013) (citations omitted). 
94. Discussions with Thomas Saenz, MALDEF General Counsel and 
President (Mar. 5, 2015) (notes on file with author).  
95. The DOJ had also argued for amicus curiae United States. Gonzalez,
677 F.3d at 387. The Deputy Solicitor General is now Judge Srinivasan, having been 
appointed to the United States Court of Appeals in May 2013. Sri Srinivasan, U.S.
COURT OF APPEALS D.C. CIRCUIT, http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/home.nsf/ 
Content/VL+-+Judges+-+SS (last visited Oct. 27, 2015). 
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Committee counsel, had argued the companion case to this point,96
the Lawyers’ Committee had secured the volunteer services of 
Patricia Millett, who had argued nearly thirty Supreme Court cases in 
her career and pressed for her to argue the respondent ITCA’s case in 
chief.97 Not only had MALDEF argued the consolidated case that had 
surfaced to the Supreme Court, making Perales lead counsel, but the 
alphabetical order of the cases—and MALDEF’s lead counsel 
status—would have resulted in Gonzalez being listed as the official 
party over the ITCA case. But in what amounted to a typographical 
error, the case emerged from the Circuit as ITCA rather than as 
Gonzalez; this still would have meant that MALDEF would argue 
the case. It was not to be, as the Lawyers’ Committee dug in its heels 
and insisted upon a referee to resolve the dispute.98 Assuming its 
superior VRA expertise and status as lead counsel would prevail in 
any fair dispute resolution, MALDEF agreed to submit the matter to 
a senior civil rights leader, who heard both sides and summarized his 
case, but who declined to pick one or the other side. In the end, he 
(literally) flipped a coin,99 and Patricia Millett became the Supreme 
Court lawyer on the case and successfully argued and won the 7–2
decision.100
VI. CONTROL OF THE NARRATIVE AND DISCURSIVE MESSAGES IN 
THE POLITY
Such disputes even among advocates on the same side of an 
issue arise more commonly than is recognized, in part because it is 
everyone’s interest to keep these disputes in the family and not to 
give any traction to the other side of the case. And in the most 
precious commodity, control of the message in the narrative flow of 
information and shaping of public opinion in the dispute, it does not 
serve the case well when these internal issues are in play and 
publicly known. As an example, one that became well-known as the 
dispute widened, the various GLBT interests in striking down same-
                                                     
96. Gonzalez, 677 F.3d at 387 (Jon M. Greenbaum, arguing for plaintiffs-
appellants The Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, et al.). 
97. Discussions with Thomas Saenz, supra note 94. She is now Judge 
Millett, having been appointed to the United States Court of Appeals in December 
2013. Patricia A. Millet, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS D.C. CIRCUIT, http://www. 
cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/home.nsf/Content/VL+-+Judges+-+PAM (last visited 
Oct. 27, 2015). 
98. Discussions with Thomas Saenz, supra note 94. 
99. Id.
100. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013). 
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sex marriage prohibitions were put to a public test when two “Odd-
Couple” colleagues decided to take up the cause and to mount a 
challenge to California’s ballot measure banning same-sex marriage, 
Proposition 8.101 Republican Ted Olson and Democrat David Boies 
joined forces a decade after they had both been involved on opposite 
sides of Bush v. Gore102 and announced their litigation plans.103
Although there was evidence that public opinion on gay rights 
and same-sex marriage was shifting, there was still a large reservoir 
of intolerance and formal state structures such as marriage bans, 
refusals to recognize domestic and family law accommodations, and 
outright hostility and harassment at all levels of government and 
private life, from immigration to inheritance rights to military 
restrictions such as Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.104 At the least, these 
outsider groups were afraid a loss would set back the cause for many 
years and fatally affect organizing efforts for incremental and more 
permanent change. Indeed, when the dust cleared, the Supreme Court 
struck down the offensive Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), but 
punted on the technical merits of the state marriage ban section of 
the case, kicking the can down the road until a different challenge 
was later filed.105
When Olson and Boies had stepped forward to sue California 
in Hollingsworth v. Perry, without having consulted or involving a 
                                                     
101. It will be difficult to top the superb history of the Hollingsworth v. 
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013), case and backstory, especially the run-up to the trial 
by KENJI YOSHINO, SPEAK NOW: MARRIAGE EQUALITY ON TRIAL (2015). For a 
comprehensive legal history of the gay rights movement in the United States, see 
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND 
THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (2014).  
102. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).  
103. YOSHINO, supra note 101, at 14-89 (Part I: Before). See also Jeffrey 
Rosen, The Trials of John Roberts, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www. 
theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/the-trials-of-john-roberts/390438/ 
(analyzing the role of Justice Roberts in same sex and health care cases). 
104. The federal policy of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” Pub. L. No. 103-160, 
107 Stat. 1670 (1993) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 654), was repealed in 2010. Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, § 2(f)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 
3516 (2010); See Russell Berman, The Awkward Clinton-Era Debate Over ‘Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell,’ THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
politics/archive/2014/10/the-awkward-clinton-era-debate-over-dont-ask-dont-tell/ 
381374/; see generally Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The 
Visibility Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485 
(1998); Laurence H. Tribe & Joshua Matz, The Constitutional Inevitability of Same-
Sex Marriage, 71 MD. L. REV. 471 (2012); William N. Eskridge Jr., Original 
Meaning and Marriage Equality, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 1067 (2015). 
105. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2661, 2668. 
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number of the traditional gay and lesbian civil rights groups and non-
profits in their litigation strategy and against the advice of many 
experienced advocates, the disagreement was not only over trial 
tactics but over the efficacy of advocacy and control of the discursive 
narrative that would be required to shape the case itself.106 Also, 
importantly, it was felt that no genuine equality could successfully 
emerge without incorporating larger community interests and 
controlling the message.107 At the least, it was felt that a gay or 
lesbian lawyer should argue or be involved in arguing the case.108
After the successful subsequent challenge to the federal DOMA 
in United States v. Windsor in 2013,109 and when the inevitable 
proper challenge to state marriage bans did present itself to the Court 
and was scheduled for argument on April 28, 2015, this issue took 
another unusual, complex turn when the various parties could not 
decide upon a single voice for arguing the consolidated cases.110 As a 
result, the parties asked Justice Roberts and the Court to allow them 
to divide the time allowed for argument into smaller pieces.111
Because challenges to four states had been consolidated, each with a 
different team of lawyers, there was no consensus as to whom the 
                                                     
106. Laurence H. Tribe & Joshua Matz, An Ephemeral Movement: 
Minimalism, Equality, and Federalism in the Struggle for Same-Sex Marriage 
Rights, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 199, 210 (2013). The bills had begun to 
mount, as one state alone agreed to pay over $1 million in attorneys’ fees to the 
ACLU over the litigation. Zoe Tillman, Wisconsin Agrees to Largest Same-Sex 
Marriage Payout: $1M, NAT’L L.J. (Mar. 30, 2015) [hereinafter Tillman, Wisconsin 
Agrees], http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202722000738/Wisconsin-
Agrees-to-Largest-SameSex-Marriage-Payout-1M; Zoe Tillman, Fees Mount in 
Marriage Cases: States Ordered to Pay Up as Same-Sex Bans Fall, NAT’L L.J. (Jan. 
12, 2015), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202714571384.
107. See Tribe & Matz, supra note 106, at 203.  
108. The legal press was a bit breathless during the period when these events 
were unfolding. See, e.g., Tillman, Wisconsin Agrees, supra note 106; Marcia Coyle, 
Supreme Court Veteran, First-Time Advocate to Argue for Gay Marriage, NAT’L
L.J. (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202722127019/ 
Supreme-Court-Veteran-FirstTime-Advocate-to-Argue-for-Gay-Marriage#ixzz
3W01pziYB; Marcia Coyle & Tony Mauro, Two High-Stakes High Court Debuts,
NAT’L L.J. (Apr. 6, 2015), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202722650222/
Two-HighStakes-High-Court-Debuts#ixzz3WMGp0GEz. 
109. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013) (striking down 
DOMA).  
110. See, e.g., Mark Walsh, States of Same-Sex Marriage, A.B.A. J., Apr. 
2015, at 19. Marcia Coyle, Who Will Argue Historic Gay Marriage Cases?, NAT’L
L.J. (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202720833996/Who-
Will-Argue-Historic-Gay-Marriage-Cases. 
111. Coyle, supra note 110. 
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first chair would be and if there would be enough time to 
accommodate more than one lawyer on the issues being argued.112
The possibilities besides private counsel hired were the ACLU, Gay 
& Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, National Center for Lesbian 
Rights, and the Lambda Legal Fund—all organizations with broad 
and deep experience in purposive GLBT civil rights advocacy.113
Originally, the Court divided the questioning up into two parts on 
which they wanted arguments, and then subdivided it further for the 
individual parties.114 In appealing the time allocation and attorney 
participation, the “lawyers emphasize that the cases were litigated 
separately in the lower courts and raised different procedural and 
factual circumstances. The cases also drew different defenses. All of 
those factors led to different points being stressed in their briefing to 
the justices, they said.”115
A scant four weeks before the April 28, 2015 U.S. Supreme 
Court arguments, the plaintiffs, seeking to strike down the state 
marriage bans, determined their own advocates in an array set out by 
the Court according to the type of bans involved in the consolidated 
cases: The Michigan and Kentucky cases involving actual bans on 
same-sex marriages were argued by Mary Bonauto, from the Gay & 
Lesbian Advocates & Defenders (GLAD), and private lawyer 
Douglas Hallward-Driemeier represented the National Center for 
Lesbian Rights, challenging the Ohio and Tennessee cases that 
involved the refusals by states to recognize same-sex marriages 
performed elsewhere.116 While GLAD’s staff Bonauto had never 
argued a Supreme Court case, she had been among the most 
experienced trial and appellate lawyers in the gay and lesbian legal 
movement, while Hallward-Driemeier had argued over a dozen 
                                                     
112. Id.  
113. Id.
114. Id.  
115. Id.  
116. Lily Hiott-Millis, Mary Bonauto & Douglas Hallward-Driemeier to 
Argue Marriage Cases at SCOTUS, FREEDOM TO MARRY (Mar. 31, 2015, 10:00 
AM), http://www.freedomtomarry.org/blog/entry/mary-bonauto-and-douglas-
hallward-driemeier-will-present-marriage-arguments. There was even a “moot-off” 
competition, or a mock trial tryout, to determine the lawyers who would argue. 
Richard Socarides, The Coming Gay-Marriage Ruling, NEW YORKER (Apr. 8, 2015), 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-coming-gay-marriage-ruling. 
MALDEF would not agree to such a competition in the Arizona matter. Discussions 
with Thomas Saenz, supra note 94. 
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Supreme Court cases.117 Her topic was allotted forty-five minutes for 
the arguments, while his issues were accorded thirty minutes.118 Both 
teams also requested that a quarter hour of their overall time be given 
to the United States, a request that was granted.119 As recently as a 
week before the final decision allocating the various times and 
assignments, the press had “reported that lawyer egos, client wishes 
and high stakes in the cases were making the choice of the pro-
marriage advocates difficult.”120
In this case, both sides had multiple parties, as the lawyers for 
the four states being sued for their restrictive laws also petitioned the 
Court under its Rule 28 authority to divide the time and allow them 
to use more lawyers than would ordinarily have been the norm.121
One Indian law case had famously careened down an uncertain path 
until days before the case was to be argued when the Court clerk held 
their feet to the fire: 
A prime example of the Supreme Court’s distaste for divided argument 
came in the 2008 case Carcieri v. Kempthorne,122 an Indian land dispute 
originating in Rhode Island. The court twice rejected motions for divided
                                                     
117. Coyle & Mauro, supra note 108; Marcia Coyle, Q&A: Mary Bonauto 
Reflects on High Court’s Gay-Marriage Ruling; Veteran Civil Rights Lawyer Says 
Debut Argument “Represented Decades of Work,” NAT’L L.J., July 20, 2015, at 15 
(discussing holding and cases that preceded it, and how additional cases will be 
likely needed to implement it fully). 
118. SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., ORDER LIST: 574 U.S. (Jan. 16, 2015),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/011615zr_f2q3.pdf.  
119. Id. (“(14-556 ) OBERGEFELL, JAMES, ET AL. V. HODGES, 
RICHARD, ET AL.; (14-562 ) TANCO, VALERIA, ET AL. V. HASLAM, GOV. 
OF TN, ET AL.; (14-571 ) DeBOER, APRIL, ET AL. V. SNYDER, GOV. OF MI, 
ET AL.; (14-574 ) BOURKE, GREGORY, ET AL. V. BESHEAR, GOV. OF KY, 
ET AL. The cases are consolidated and the petitions for writs of certiorari are 
granted limited to the following questions: 1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment 
require a state to license a marriage between two people of the same sex? 2) Does 
the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between two 
people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed 
out-of-state? A total of ninety minutes is allotted for oral argument on Question 1. A 
total of one hour is allotted for oral argument on Question 2. The parties are limited 
to filing briefs on the merits and presenting oral argument on the questions presented 
in their respective petitions.”); see also Michael S. Rosenwald, ‘I Just Stood Up for 
Our Marriage,’ WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 2015, at A1, A4. 
120. Coyle, supra note 108. 
121. See Walsh, supra note 110. 
122. 129 S. Ct. 338 (2008). The invaluable resource SCOTUSBLOG spelled 
out some of the behind the scenes maneuvering. Lyle Denniston, Jockeying for the 
Podium, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 29, 2008, 7:20 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
2008/10/jockeying-for-the-podium/ (detailing case management disputes).  
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argument filed by former Solicitor General Theodore Olson and local 
lawyer Joseph Larisa, both of whom sought to argue on behalf of the state.  
The impasse continued until three days before the argument, when [then-
SCOTUS Chief Clerk] William Suter gave the two one hour to decide. If 
they could not agree, Suter warned, the state would forfeit its chance to 
present oral argument—an extraordinary penalty. Larisa stood down and 
Olson, a Gibson Dunn & Crutcher partner, argued the case.123
CONCLUSION: CASE MANAGEMENT IN PURPOSIVE LITIGATION:
“GREAT CASES LIKE HARD CASES MAKE BAD LAW”
In 1904, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. famously dissented 
in an antitrust matter that “[g]reat cases like hard cases make bad 
law.”124 He meant that SCOTUS cases make their way to the pinnacle 
for a variety of strategic and logistical reasons, but often are the 
wrong case or a case wrongly structured for genuine relief or social 
good.125 I would suggest that an equally important corollary is that 
bad cases or the right cases badly structured can set back civil rights 
progress.126 The means by which this failure occurs is often the 
                                                     
123. Marcia Coyle & Tony Mauro, Marriage-Rights Advocates at Odds Over 
Who Will Argue Cases, NAT’L L.J. (Mar. 23, 2015), http://www.nationallawjournal. 
com/id=1202721230497/MarriageRights-Advocates-at-Odds-Over-Who-Will-
Argue-Cases#ixzz3XPKC23Q1.  
124. N. Sec. Co. v United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, C.J., 
dissenting). This dissent and its various meanings have been comprehensively 
commented upon. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U.
CHI. L. REV. 883 (2006); LACKLAND H. BLOOM, JR., DO GREAT CASES MAKE BAD 
LAW? (2014). 
125.  
Holmes did not believe that identifying the problematics of great cases and 
hard cases was inconsistent with his view about the merits of case-based 
lawmaking, because for Holmes both great cases and hard cases presented 
vivid factual settings whose very vividness made proper resolution of the 
particular case especially salient even when that proper resolution would 
have negative effects on future and different cases. But such scenarios 
were aberrational, Holmes believed, and he saw no reason why the 
distorting effects of great or hard cases would be present for the mine run 
of ordinary common law litigation.  
Schauer, supra note 124, at 884-85.  
126. As one prominent example of how a difficult case was settled rather 
than risking a loss, see Elaine Jones, Luck Was Not a Factor: The Importance of a 
Strategic Approach to Civil Rights Litigation, 11 ASIAN L.J. 290, 293-94 (2004) 
(reviewing settlement in Piscataway case at final stages of SCOTUS arguments); 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION SETTLEMENT; Excerpts From Statement by School 
Board Lawyer on Lawsuit’s Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 1997), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/11/22/nyregion/affirmative-action-settlement-
excerpts-statement-school-board-lawyer-lawsuit-s.html. While it is beyond the scope 
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overarching management of the case and its many moving parts: 
whose case it really is, who gets to make the many key decisions, 
who can fashion the theory of the case and its constitutive narrative, 
who can speak for its rhetoric and storytelling, and who can engage 
in the public discourse and message control.  
These considerations happen regularly each year in the Court’s 
calendar, and not only in civil rights cases. In an administrative 
law/environmental law matter involving a seven-case consolidation, 
the Court split the differences by requiring a single lawyer to argue 
but gave additional time to the state governments to plead their 
cases.127 But the purposive organizational interests of civil rights 
litigation often involve the attempts to meld competing theories of 
the case, as in Keyes, and to accommodate the larger social interests 
often at play as the repeat-player organizations jockey for 
establishing primacy of the subject matter as well as management of 
the actual case. In the important and visible 2015 gay and lesbian 
cases, part of the tension being played out was the strong sense that 
the lead Supreme Court lawyer should be an acknowledged member 
of the GLBT community, as well as being experienced in the actual 
                                                                                                               
of this project, I have come to believe that the large and growing number of 
purposive groups and the small SCOTUS docket have led to this increased 
competition and organizational branding. The high stakes in play and, remarkably, 
the rise of organizational interests in Latino issues, for example, has meant that 
MALDEF is cooperating but also competing with other organizational players. 
When the next history of the ACLU is written, the organization’s increased interest 
in immigration, as just one example, will likely be traceable in substantial part to the 
assumption of Puerto Rican Anthony Romero to its presidency.  
127. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 702 (2014); see Coyle & 
Mauro, supra note 123. This strong hand of the judges in such cases is important. In 
an influential article describing the rise of public interest litigation, Abram Chayes 
noted: 
The characteristic features of the public law model are very 
different from those of the traditional model. The party structure is 
sprawling and amorphous, subject to change over the course of the 
litigation. The traditional adversary relationship is suffused and intermixed 
with negotiating and mediating processes at every point. The judge is the 
dominant figure in organizing and guiding the case, and he draws for 
support not only on the parties and their counsel, but on a wide range of 
outsiders—masters, experts, and oversight personnel. Most important, the 
trial judge has increasingly become the creator and manager of complex 
forms of ongoing relief, which have widespread effects on persons not 
before the court and require the judge’s continuing involvement in 
administration and implementation. 
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1281, 1284 (1976). 
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legal and legislative issues, preferably one who was a member of an 
identifiable and purposive organization’s legal staff.128 Her co-
counsel was a private Michigan lawyer, Carole Stanyar, who was the 
counsel of record in the case.129 Yet these crucial decisions were 
actually resolved only in the final days before the Court arguments.130
Repeat purposive advocates master these various details, or try 
to, and each case has its own arc and narrative structure. MALDEF 
has evolved and matured to the point where its lawyers often control 
their own fates, but this has not universally been the case, as the 
several backstories here revealed. As hard as it is to envision a coin 
flip or court’s docketing error determining such fundamentals of a 
case, these actually happened. Good fortune can help, as in the case 
of Plyler, and one can improve the likelihood that good fortune will, 
in fact, occur, but the shoals of high stakes litigation are 
treacherous.131 Particularly in the organizations that have broader and 
more comprehensive interests, care has to be taken to narrow and 
concentrate upon the most strategic interests and to evaluate the 
most-ideal litigation vehicle, and such cases can be shaped in an 
iterative, long-term strategy or incorporated into an appropriate 
vehicle if one arises. As repeat players, all must conserve their 
resources and choose carefully, even as they live for the next such 
battle.  
The history of civil rights litigation and legislation is a long and 
glorious U.S. narrative, as episodic and punctuated as our country’s 
history. To be sure, there are setbacks, even cruel reversals, as in 
Shelby County v. Holder case, one that eviscerated the heart of the 
VRA.132 As Nina Perales noted at the time, in recording the history of 
anti-Latino voting rights prejudice in Texas:  
Shortly before the expansion of Section 5 to Texas, the Court in White v. 
Regester invalidated Texas’s state House redistricting plan because it 
“invidiously excluded Mexican-Americans from effective participation in 
political life.” In every redistricting cycle following White, at least one of 
Texas’s statewide redistricting plans has been blocked by the courts 
because of discrimination against Latino voters. In three of these four 
cases, the preclearance requirement of Section 5 prevented the 
discriminatory redistricting plans from going into effect. Since 1975, 
                                                     
128. See Coyle & Mauro, supra note 123.
129. Coyle, supra note 108.
130. Id.
131. Plyler had several points at which the hard work and strategic litigation 
program was matched by good luck. I examine a number of these in NO
UNDOCUMENTED CHILD, supra note 56, at 30-31. 
132. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
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Section 5 has worked to block more than two hundred changes in election 
procedures that discriminated against minority voters in Texas.133
Of course, there will be other days, in the nature of long term 
repeat players and veteran, mature organizations. These groups win 
more often than they lose, and each judges its success by the 
incremental gains and slow change that Court decisions occasion. 
Implementation and even recovering attorney’s fees must be 
undertaken, and the constant search for resources serves as a natural 
constraint, as does the larger polity. And as Justice Ginsburg has 
noted of her own early Court successes gained on behalf of women 
plaintiffs, these wins must be both consolidated and implemented, 
but cannot get out too far ahead of the polity, lest it appear to be a 
bridge too far.134 While she was speaking of abortion litigation, 
which has lost ground over time, an opposite narrative emerged 
concerning same sex marriage and GLBT civil rights generally.135
Most observers have found themselves surprised at the relative speed 
with which change quickened, even after many years of lower court 
litigation and legislative hits and misses.136
                                                     
133. Nina Perales, Shelby County v. Holder: Latino Voters Need Section 5 
Today More than Ever, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 12, 2013, 5:29 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/02/shelby-county-v-holder-latino-voters-need-
section-5-today-more-than-ever/.  
134. She noted Roe v. Wade as the prime example. Allen Pusey, Ginsburg: 
Court Should Have Avoided Broad-Based Decision in Roe v. Wade, A.B.A. J. (May 
13, 2013, 2:20 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ginsburg_ 
expands_on_her_disenchantment_with_roe_v._wade_legacy/. The same scenario 
has also been detailed by legal scholar Nan D. Hunter, in Reflections on Sexual 
Liberty and Equality: “Through Seneca Falls and Selma and Stonewall,” 60 UCLA
L. REV. DISCOURSE 172, 179-80 (2013) (explaining that backlash to Roe v. Wade
“froze” development of substantive due process).
135. Of the many measures I could cite for this remarkable trajectory, among 
the more telling is how major law firms have, in essence, bailed out in providing pro 
bono representation for the defense of states. See the fascinating moonwalk back 
from identifying with the various states’ sides in firm representation. See, e.g.,
Katelyn Polantz, Michigan Firm Stays Out of Gay Marriage Case, NAT’L L.J. (Apr. 
13, 2015), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202722815042/Michigan-Firm-
Stays-Out-of-Gay-Marriage-Case-That-Partner-Will-Argue#ixzz3WqQrLOzv; 
Adam Liptak, The Case Against Gay Marriage: Top Law Firms Won’t Touch It,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2015, at A1. 
136. Of course, no matter how these cases turn out, the battle for 
implementation and as-applied challenges will continue. See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, 
Options Few for Opponents on Marriages, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2015, at A1; Alan 
Blinder & Richard Fausett, Clerk Who Said ‘No’ Won’t Be Alone in Court, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 3, 2015, at A18 (noting elected county clerk imprisoned for contempt 
of court for refusing federal judge’s order to issue marriage licenses; clerk 
represented by purposive organization Liberty Counsel, established in 1989). 
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Through this case study of one longstanding purposive civil 
rights organization, an area that is likely to surface is how the 
architecture of purposive high-stakes litigation has built-in 
headwinds that can limit the full range of litigation possibilities. Of 
course, every case has to make it on its own merits, but it is also 
clear from these examples that there are many contingencies and 
moving parts that count, and count significantly. In immigration, for 
example, the need to employ preemption as a legal theory instead of 
due process and equal protection can also make it more difficult to 
collect attorney’s fees, given federal statutes and fee allowances and 
state statutes governing fee-shifting in a number of states can make it 
impossible to recover fees, even when parties prevail.137 And on a 
good day, judges do not challenge the details of fee requests. And 
depending upon the ruling, a complex case can either award fees or 
not.138 For example, in a complicated federal trial, the jury found for 
a woman plaintiff who was routinely called a “bitch” by her male co-
workers in a manufacturing plant: Trying the Title VII case had a 
$300,000 cap, but the jury also awarded an additional $170,000 in 
back pay and $350,000 in front pay as well as $400,000 in 
compensatory damages under both Title VII and the state statute (the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, which does not allow punitive 
                                                                                                               
However, to give a sense of how far we have evolved on GLBT issues, see Childers 
v. Dallas Police Department, 513 F. Supp. 134, 142 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (“I have no 
trouble deciding that the government’s interest in maintaining the efficient operation 
of the police department and ensuring the proper performance of duties in the 
Storekeeper # 7 job, outweigh Plaintiff’s interest in constitutional protection for his 
expression and association. I emphasize that Plaintiff is in no way being denied the 
opportunity to associate whenever and with whomever he pleases. He is denied only 
the opportunity to work in the property room of the police department.”), aff’d, 669 
F.2d 732 (Table) (5th Cir. 1982). With this decision, my first cousin Steven (Slade) 
Childers was denied a position in the Dallas Police Department property storage 
room, even though he had passed all the required tests and was concededly 
qualified. He was represented by the ACLU. 
137. For a review of fee-shifting statutes at the state and federal levels, see 
generally Note, State Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes: Are We Quietly Repealing the
American Rule?, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 321 (1984), and Martin A. Schwartz, 
Attorney’s Fees in Civil Rights Cases—October 2009 Term, 27 TOURO L. REV. 113 
(2011). For a comparative national review of such statutes, see generally Jonathan T. 
Molot, Fee Shifting and the Free Market, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1807 (2013). 
138. Sometimes, the “prevailing party” does not receive fees. See, e.g., Zoe 
Tillman, Wiley Rein Denied $2M in Fees in VRA Case, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 7, 2015, at 
15 (denial of attorney’s fees, notwithstanding Voting Rights Act victory in Shelby 
County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013)); see Texas v. United States, No. 14-5151, 
2015 WL 4910078 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 18, 2015). 
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damages).139 All told, cobbled from different valences, the jury 
awarded her $13 million, including more than $12 million in punitive 
damages.140 The overarching business model of spending all the 
resources up front only to receive fees—if allowed—after winning 
and after substantial delays is extraordinarily precarious. This 
wildcatting model can only work in a mature organization, one with 
deep political and financial reserves, including the range of resources 
that can attract support from deep-pocket law firms and other 
technical voluntary expertise. 
When these histories are written and contemplated, it is very 
likely that purposive civil rights organizations and their litigation 
strategies will be an important part of the emergent folklore and civil 
rights sagas.141 They will form the argot that will arise and the 
corridos that will be sung. And the grail will continue to be good 
cases and reasonable control over the life of these emerging cases, 
and their afterlife. 
                                                     
139. Saranac Hale Spencer, Pittsburgh Jury Awards $12.5M in Gender Bias 
Case, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 22, 2015, at 1.  
140. Id.
141. This implementation saga began even before the Supreme Court 
decision was announced and escalated immediately after the Supreme Court 
decision was announced. Obergefell v. Hodges. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); see, e.g.,
Adam Nagourney, G.O.P. Struggling with Shifts on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 27, 2015, at A1 (noting that conservatives vow “the fight over same-sex 
marriage would not end with a Supreme Court decision”); Erik Eckholm, Next Fight 
for Gay Rights: Bias in Jobs and Housing, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2015, at A1; Jeffrey 
Toobin, God and Marriage Equality, NEW YORKER (June 26, 2015), 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/god-and-marriage-equality. 

